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ABSTRACT: 
 
 
This article seeks to further our understanding of what methodological nationalism is and offer 
some insights towards its overcoming. The critical side of its argument unravels the 
paradoxical constitution of the current debate on methodological nationalism; namely, the fact 
that methodological nationalism is simultaneously regarded as wholly negative and all-pervasive 
in contemporary social science. I substantiate the idea of this paradox by revisiting some of the 
most successful attempts at the conceptualisation of the nation-state that have sought to 
transcend methodological nationalism in four disciplines: sociology, nationalism studies, 
anthropology and social psychology. The positive side of the article’s argument introduces a 
distinction between different versions of methodological nationalism with the help of which it 
tries to address some of the problems found in the literature. Theoretically, methodological 
nationalism is associated with, and criticised for, its explanatory reductionism in which the rise 
and main features of the nation-state are used to explicate the rise and main features of 
modernity itself. Historically, the article reassesses the problem of its prevalence, that is, whether 
methodological nationalism is a key feature of the history of the social sciences at large. 
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The question of methodological nationalism has gained currency in contemporary social 
sciences over the past couple of decades. Although it was first identified as a problem in the 
early 1970s (Martins 1974), it was only with the rise – and later decline – of globalization 
theory that it became a salient issue in relation to studying the nation-state’s position in 
modernity (Beck 2000, Chernilo 2007a, Wimmer and Schiller 2002). The critical aim of this 
piece is to argue that even though we have moved a long way in clarifying what we mean by, 
and what is wrong with, methodological nationalism, the debate seems to have stalled. Its 
positive goal is the introduction of a distinction between a theoretical and a historical version 
of the argument on methodological nationalism that may enhance its critique. The substantive 
task that remains is trying to conceptualise the nation-state beyond methodological 
nationalism. 
 
In terms of its structure, the article begins by explicating the paradoxical constitution of the 
current debate on methodological nationalism; namely, the fact that methodological 
nationalism is simultaneously regarded as wholly untenable and all-pervasive in a number of 
recent discussions all across the social sciences. It illustrates this paradox by looking at some of 
the problems faced by some sophisticated attempts at conceptualising the nation-state in 
sociology, nationalism studies, anthropology and social psychology.i Both strengths and 
weaknesses of these approaches will be highlighted in order to identify some of the most 
pressing issues when seeking to conceptualise the nation-state beyond methodological 
nationalism. The following sections seek to break that paradox by expanding, in turn, on the 
theoretical and the historical dimensions of the debate. On the theoretical side, methodological 
nationalism is associated with, and criticised for, its explanatory reductionism; it arises when the 
rise and main features of the nation-state are used to explicate the rise and main features of 
modernity itself. It is held that the critique of methodological nationalism requires, at this level, 
a strongly universalistic conception of modernity in which the nation-state is explicated as a 
result of modernity’s deep-seated structural trends. On the historical side, the argument moves 
against the conventional view that the social sciences have tended to reify and naturalise the 
nation-state. The breaking of the paradox of methodological nationalism lies, at this level, in 
reassessing the problem of its prevalence, that is, whether methodological nationalism is a key, if 
not the key, feature of the history of the social sciences at large.  
 
The paradoxical debate on methodological nationalism in contemporary social 
sciences 
 
Methodological nationalism is seen as a result of the historical formation of both modernity and 
the social sciences that cohered around processes of nation-state formation (Calhoun 1999, 
Smelser 1997, Wagner 1994). At its simplest, then, methodological nationalism is found when 
the nation-state is treated as the natural and necessary representation of modern society. A fuller definition 
would run as follows: the equation between the idea of society as social theory’s key conceptual reference and 
the historical processes of modern nation-state formation. The idea of society becomes the all-
encompassing presupposition upon which the most important features of modernity are 
explicated: class formations, growing bureaucratisation, structural differentiation. The nation-
state and modern society become conceptually as well as historically indistinguishable.  
 
A fundamental issue to note is that methodological nationalism is real and poses real problems 
– indeed, it can be found within the social sciences as much as within the social world itself. In 
fact, a salient feature of the literature that has explicitly dealt with understanding the rise and 
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main features of the nation-state in modernity is that no one positions herself as in favour of 
methodological nationalism. The polemic is just not split between those for whom 
methodological nationalism opens up new avenues for our knowledge about the nation-state 
and others who would argue that it hinders our ability to understand it. Even if one takes into 
account the fact that there is a dispute over its causes, consequences and possible remedies, the 
fact remains that methodological nationalism is consensually rejected – and rightly so. This 
may not be wholly surprising because methodological nationalism is regarded as a form of 
reification, but it is nonetheless curious to realise that no one seems prepared to challenge the 
proposition that methodological nationalism is in fact a reductionist way of thinking.  
 
But the paradoxical constitution of the current debate comprises an additional dimension: the 
label ‘methodological nationalism’ is being thrown back and forth among the discussants as a 
mark of shame. We are in the presence of a certain intellectual outlook that is unanimously 
rejected but which, allegedly at least, extends all across contemporary social sciences. 
Methodological nationalism is generally recognised as a sin but we all become unintended 
sinners the very second we try to grasp the nation-state’s fundamental features and the 
problematic nature of its position in modernity.ii The paradox of the current debate on 
methodological nationalism is that no one admits to be committed to it and yet its presence is allegedly 
found in every corner of the contemporary social scientific landscape.  
 
The works I should now like to review are chosen because, from their different disciplines, 
they have all made an important contribution to our understanding of what a nation-state is 
and where its relationship to modernity lies. I have only admiration for them and their explicit 
interest in avoiding the kinds of reification and naturalisation that are the centre of the critique 
of methodological nationalism. But it is my contention that they still confront serious 
difficulties and these are equally instructive. If the following presentation of different 
disciplinary standpoints seems at time unnecessarily descriptive, I find this necessary in order 
to prove (a) that the debate is beginning to move in circles and (b) that methodological 
nationalism poses real problems to everyone interested in studying the nation-state. My own 
contribution to the discussion lies, towards the end of this section, in advancing a distinction 
between a theoretical and a historical version of the argument of methodological nationalism 
that may help start breaking up the paradoxical state of the debate.  
 
Let me start with one of the earliest attempts at conceptualising the nation-state without 
naturalising its emergence and key features. Anthony Giddens was possibly one of the very 
first social scientists to address directly the substantive issues behind the problem of 
methodological nationalism: what is a nation-state and what is its role in conceptualising 
modernity’s development. In 1973, that is, before the notion of methodological nationalism 
was coined, he argued that ‘[t]he primary unit of sociological analysis, the sociologist’s ‘society’ 
– in relation to the industrialised world at least - has always been, and must continue to be, the 
administratively bounded nation-state’ (Giddens 1973: 265). Later in 1981, he argued that the 
modern nation-state and modern capitalism were co-original and had co-evolved: ‘capitalist 
states emerged as nation-states: the association between capitalism and the nation-state was not 
the “accident of history” that it has appeared to be’. He then added that despite its European 
origins, ‘the nation-state system has become a world-wide one (…) the emergence of the 
nation state was integrally bound up with the expansion of capitalism’ (Giddens 1981: 12). The 
key for Giddens is the nation-state’s capacity for drawing together all the resources that 
effectively turned it into a kind of ‘“power-container” shaping the development of the 
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capitalist societies’. The definitive claim of his studies into the position of the nation-state in 
modernity is however dangerously close to methodological nationalism: ‘modern “societies” 
are nation-states, existing within a nation-state system’ (…) “societies” have often been 
understood by sociologists, implicitly or otherwise, as a clearly bounded system with an 
obvious and easily identifiable set of distinguishing traits’ (Giddens 1985: 1 & 17). Giddens 
makes his characterisation of modernity cohere around the nation-state: the success of the 
nation-state as a modern socio-political arrangement has to do with having become the organising 
centre of modernity itself. But as he arrives at these results he just avoids falling into the 
problem of methodological nationalism because the success of the nation-state as a modern 
socio-political arrangement depends upon what he refers to as the four key structural dimensions 
of modernity: bureaucratisation, industrialisation, capitalism and militarization/surveillance 
(Giddens 1985). In fact, already in his early work he had qualified his commitment to the 
nation-state’s apparent centrality in modernity by arguing that the idea of society, understood 
as the national society, ‘has never been the isolated, the “internally developing” system which 
has normally been implied in social theory’ (Giddens 1973: 265). The point I am trying to make 
is that, regardless of whether the historical claim that the nation-state has become central in 
modernity is true, it remains independent from the explanatory proposition that modernity itself 
can be delineated as the sum or result of different national trajectories that evolve from the 
inside out. The causal relation he advances is that the worldwide expansion of the nation-state 
system is the result rather than the cause of the development of modernity itself. 
 
If we now turn our attention to nationalism studies, an obvious choice is Anthony D. Smith 
whose interest in nations and nationalism derives from his own previous reconstruction of 
conceptions of development and evolution in mainstream sociology (Smith 1973). He 
diagnosed serious difficulties in such conceptions – also, as in Giddens, in terms of an 
endogenous and internalist bias – and thence comes to the conclusion that sociology’s naïve 
modernism has simply neglected the importance of nationalism and national identities as key 
aspects of social life. The conviction he has held ever since is that the rise of modern nation-
states has to be traced back to the peoples’ own pre-modern ethnic origins (Smith 1991). And 
in terms of the disciplinary development of sociology, his key point is that classical sociology 
was simply unable to grasp the problems of nationhood, nation-building and nation-state 
formation (Smith 1979, 1983). More recently, he argues that ‘the fashionable Western 
insistence on multiculturalism and the polyethnic nation’ have not at all undermined the 
salience of the nation-state in the international scene as they have just not ‘dissolved the 
centrality of dominant or core ethnies, whose culture, myths, mores and memories continue to 
define the national state’ (Smith 2006: 179). When this approach is subject to scrutiny, the 
standard criticism is that nations as such cannot be identified before the rise of mass political 
movements in the late nineteenth century. But the goal of the critique is not only to reject the 
proposition that nations – in their prior ethnie form – are pre-modern. It aims, much more 
profoundly, at the ontological claim in Smith’s ethno-symbolic approach: nations are not the 
definitive Träger of human identities to be traced back endlessly in history. Thus, for instance, 
while Walker Connor rejects the kind of reductionism that is attached to transhistorical 
conceptions of human identity, he seems to reintroduce it from the modernist backdoor. 
Nations are no longer equated with the long durée but have become the unrivalled form of social 
identity in modernity: the history of nations has become, in practice, coeval with that of 
modernity itself. As soon as the two modern conceptions of nation – political citizenry and 
ethnic identity – become one, then ‘the political history of the world since the Napoleonic 
Wars has largely been a tale of tension between the two identities, each possessing its own 
 5 
irrefragable and exclusive claim to political legitimacy’ (Connor 2004: 38). Modernism and 
ethno-symbolism surely push in opposite directions when it comes to timing the emergence of 
the nation, but on the critical proposition of pre-empting the salience of nations and nation-
states in modernity, they do not stand that far apart.  
 
In the fields of anthropology and migration studies, Andreas Wimmer and Nina G. Schiller 
(2002) have urged that methodological nationalism be definitively overcome. They have 
explicitly reflected upon different versions of methodological nationalism in the social sciences 
and distinguish between three different strands that they call: 
  
ignorance, naturalization and territorial limitation. The three variants are more or less 
prominent in different fields of enquiry and mutually reinforce each other, forming a 
coherent epistemic structure, a self-reinforcing way of looking at and describing the 
social world. The three variants are more or less prominent in different fields of 
enquiry. Ignorance is the dominant modus of methodological nationalism in grand 
theory; naturalization of “normal” empirical science; territorial limitation of the study 
of nationalism and state building (Wimmer and Schiller 2002: 308).  
 
This distinction between three versions of methodological nationalism comes up as a result of 
their own empirical work so it is not surprising that they find that so-called grand theory has 
simply ignored the nation-state. Their case against the methodological nationalism to be found 
in ‘normal’ empirical social science is however stronger. Schiller’s attention has been devoted 
to the relationship between migration and the nation-state and she duly complains about the 
mutually reinforcing trend of depicting recent migration trends as novel and hence neglecting 
the role of migratory waves throughout the history of nation-states (Basch, Schiller and Blanc 
1994). A false dichotomy is thus set up between the traditional and fully territorialised nation-
state and the recent flurry of studies on flows, fluidities and mobilities (Levitt and Schiller 
2004). Wimmer’s work on the politics of ethnic cleansing highlights the exclusionary side of 
national democracy. He firmly associates the nation-state with modernity’s key features: 
‘modernity itself is cast in nationalist and ethnicised forms’ (Wimmer 2002: 52). But the crucial 
element that pushes his analysis beyond methodological nationalism is his insistence on how 
the nation-state incarnates the project of modernity with its lights (national democracy) as well 
as its shadows (ethnic cleansing). 
 
One last case can be found in social psychology. Michael Billig has studied there how the 
ideology of modern nationalism is uncritically reproduced at the level of common sense. What 
he finely refers to as the ‘banal nationalism’ of most Western democracies is a form of 
nationalism whose ‘metonymic image (…) is not a flag which is constantly waved with fervent 
passion; it is the flag hanging unnoticed on the public building’ (Billig: 1995: 8). He points to 
the complications associated with studying the nation-state as he suggests that nationalism is 
not only ‘simultaneously obvious and obscure’ but also ‘the ideology by which the world of 
nations has come to seem the natural world’ (Billig 1995: 36). Quite rightly, he urges that we 
rather look at the nation-state as a single form of modern socio-political arrangement: ‘[w]ith 
historical hindsight, it might seem inevitable that the nation-state system emerged, but it is 
hard to see an inevitability about the particular nations themselves’ (Billig 1995: 28). And he is 
surely aware of the complications at stake as he argues that ‘[h]istorical forces may have 
combined to produce the nation-state as modernity’s logical form of governance. Yet, a willful 
anarchy seems to have accompanied the way the logical principle has been established in 
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practice’ (Billig 1995: 24). He seeks to denounce a certain fallacy he witnesses in much of 
twentieth-century social science between ‘our patriotism’ and ‘their nationalism’ (Billig 1995: 
55), a separation which results from the ideological prejudices upon which these disciplines 
have been established, and which goes a long way to reinforce the naturalization of the nation-
state that has proved so prevalent in these same disciplines. But his own theorizing begins to 
feel the heat of methodological nationalism as he echoes the claim that nowhere is 
methodological nationalism more apparent than in sociology’s use of the idea of society: ‘the 
“society” which lies at the of sociology’s own self-definition is created in the image of the 
nation-state (…) the emphasis on “society” and the implicit modeling of “society” on nation, 
has both reified and concealed nationhood’ (Billig 1995: 53-4). As he grounds his analyses 
precisely upon the dichotomy he seeks to overcome, the danger is however to end up 
mirroring the object of one’s own critique. What we have now is ‘his own’ self-critical attitude 
towards methodological nationalism and ‘their’ – mainstream social sciences’, that is – 
naturalization of the nation-state. 
 
As said, with the past few pages I have simply tried to substantiate the claim of the paradoxical 
constitution of the current debate on methodological nationalism: it poses real problems, no 
one is committed to it, but is present everywhere. The nation-state has proved elusive for the 
social sciences so the difficulties that emerge when studying it are to be taken seriously. Indeed, 
it would be unfair simply to raise the charge of methodological nationalism against these works 
in terms of both their explicit intentions and substantive contributions. Yet we have seen how 
in all cases unresolved tensions remain and at least some of the complications have to do with 
the need of specifying further the different planes and issues at stake. Peter Beilharz (2008) has 
in fact questioned whether the debate centres at all on ‘methodological’ issues or whether it is 
about ‘theoretical’ or even ‘ontological’ nationalism. Start calling things the way they actually 
are is always a god advice but my option for now is to stick with a term that has served us 
reasonably well – at least because it brought to the foreground a number of issues that had 
remained in the background for too long: the common sense use of the idea of society, the 
salience of nations and states in modernity. Having said this, we need to acknowledge that 
more than methodological questions are at stake. Indeed, the specifically methodological 
dimension is at centre of Ulrich Beck’s comments that as long as statistics keep being 
uncritically collected at the national level, and keep being organised for cross-national 
comparisons, we shall remain unable to do research outside the national box (Beck and 
Sznaider 2006): a number of aspects of modern social life – old trends as well emerging ones – 
cannot be registered, or get underrepresented, on the basis of national statistics. From 
centuries-old experiences of transnational families whose memories and current lives have 
been split among several nationalities and states to the rapid transformation of sporting 
allegiances in which neighbourhood, town, region and several countries become intermingled 
in the fate of one team; from the persistent cosmopolitan networks of protection that 
intellectuals and revolutionaries have provided for themselves in times of crises to the 
changing funding-strategies of scientific institutions which owe more to local and global 
partners than to ‘their’ national governments. In more analytical terms, we need to gather 
empirical information in such a way that makes possible to reflect upon trends and processes 
that have been traditionally neglected because national categories pre-empt data collection. 
 
But we have also seen that these are not the central dimensions on which the debate actually 
centres. What we are really after is to understand the rise, main features and normative legacy 
of the nation-state in modernity. I would therefore like to advance a distinction between a 
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theoretical and a historical way of addressing the problem of methodological nationalism that may 
hopefully help us to move forward. 
 
 The theoretical version of methodological nationalism arises when it is assumed that the 
deep-seated conceptual structure of the social sciences leads them to think exclusively from 
within the national box: modernity’s deep-seated structural trends and features are seen as the 
sum of a number of different national trajectories. The social sciences would have adopted the 
nation-state as its ultimate and most consequential blind-spot and the conceptualisation of 
modernity – explicitly or otherwise – becomes wholly reliant on the nation-state to have any 
real explanatory purchase. If we now try to summarise the different positions that seem to fall 
into this version of methodological nationalism, the following five arguments can be found: 
 
1. Explanatory argument: The rise and main features of the nation-state are used to 
explicate the rise and main features of modernity itself. Modernity is the sum of national 
trajectories. 
2. Centrality argument: Nationalism is the modern culture and modernity is cast in 
nationalistic terms. 
3. Container argument: The nation-state has succeeded in caging all aspects of modern 
social life. 
4. Internalist argument: The nation-state is an isolated, self-sufficient and endogenously 
developing unit. 
5. International system argument: The world is naturally divided into an indefinite number 
of formally analogous national units and the international system is composed now by 
nearly 200 of those units. 
 
 The historical version of methodological nationalism suggests that, because the 
foundational period of social theory and the social sciences is coeval with that of the rise of the 
nation-state, these disciplines have tended to model, explicitly or otherwise, all their major 
concepts such as society, culture, or the state on ideal notions of the nation-state. The 
prevalence of methodological nationalism in the social sciences is then predicated upon the 
idea that modernity’s most salient historical trends are processes of nation-state unification 
alongside territorial and cultural lines. Again in this case, we find that the historical form of 
methodological nationalism consists in a number of different arguments. 
 
6. Prevalence argument: The nation-state is the most fundamental blind-spot of the social 
sciences’ canon. 
7. Ignorance argument: Grand social theory has thoroughly neglected the importance of 
the nation-state in the development of modernity.  
8. Reification argument: Any attempt at studying the nation-state with conventional social 
scientific tools is bound to naturalise its most important features. 
9. Eurocentrism argument: The nation-state being a mostly European institution, 
methodological nationalism is another expression of the social sciences’ inextricable 
Eurocentrism. 
10. Rise and fall argument: The co-evolution of the social sciences and the nation-state ties 
their destinies closely together; the social sciences’ current crisis is explicated by the nation-
state’s own historical decline. 
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Arguments 1 to 5 emphasise the theoretical problem of explicating modernity, whereas 
arguments 6 to 10 point to the historical juncture that links the rise of the social sciences, the rise 
of modernity and the rise of the nation-state itself. Both groups of arguments can complement 
each other but they neither automatically require nor necessarily presuppose one another. I 
believe that this distinction may help us account for some of the difficulties we have witnessed, 
and in what follows I shall expand on each version in the spirit of contributing to move the 
debate forward.  
 
Theory: Can the nation-state explicate the rise of modernity? 
 
Arguments 2 to 5 above have the nation-state as modernity’s key organising centre and the 
locus around which the modern project almost naturally coheres – what Stephen Toulmin 
(1990) refers to as the scaffolding of modernity. In relation to the literature we reviewed in the 
previous section, then, Wimmer may be falling for argument 2, whereas Giddens and Billig 
seem closer to arguments 3 and 5. But they all reject argument 1, explanatory methodological 
nationalism, as their claims all move from modernity’s central features to processes of nation-
state formation. Even if the nation-state is seen as the central container of modern social 
relations in these works, its emergence and main features are accounted for from the outside 
in, as it were. But although there is a naturalisation of the nation-state there, the most 
problematic form of reification of argument 1 is being avoided. This bolder kind of explanatory 
methodological nationalism arises when the rise and main features of the nation-state are used to 
explicate the rise and main features of modernity itself – the thesis that the nation-state can, on its own, 
be used to account for modernity’s main features. I find this proposition particularly 
problematic because, rather than looking at the nation-state as the formidable institutional 
outcome of modernity’s deep-seated trends that it actually is, the nation-state is taken instead as 
modernity’s fundamental cause. The nation-state becomes the key independent variable with the 
help of which whatever aspect of modernity can be eventually delineated and the ultimate 
explication of modernity relies fully upon the nation-state. It is when nations become 
ontologically given, either throughout human history (Smith) or at least in modernity (Connor), 
that we encounter argument 1 of explanatory methodological nationalism.iii 
 
Indeed, the question of methodological nationalism arose to counteract some internalist 
tendencies that were arguably prevalent in 1970s sociology, so the question has always cohered 
around the role of the nation-state in explicating modernity’s key developmental tendencies 
(Chernilo 2007, 2010). The critical point here is whether the nation-state is given a key role in 
the explication of modernity itself: from Sonderwegs that account for the peculiarities of national 
customs and tastes to the way in which the national curricula and health provision are 
organised; from millennial phenotypes to differentiated attitudes towards pets and children’s 
access to restaurants. Nationalistic ways of thinking, and methodological nationalism is surely 
one of them, take for granted the world’s division into nations and then explicate the dramatic 
expansion of the nation-state throughout the world as a kind of natural telos of whatever 
number of Volksgeists. They fall into the logical fallacy of presupposing the existence of that 
phenomenon they in fact ought to be explicating: the success of the nation-state form over the 
past two centuries.  
 
To transcend this form of methodological nationalism requires robust conceptualisations of 
modernity as a single evolutionary accomplishment of the human species so that we can then 
begin to delineate its internal differentiation according to a number of different lines - regional, 
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religious, socio-economic and indeed national. Rather than incommensurability among 
essentially different worldviews, the challenge is to reassess modernity’s truly original 
universalistic aspirations by coming to terms with its definitive global expansion vis-à-vis the 
decline of its Eurocentric matrix: the task is that of comprehending those general trends and 
events that mark the truly worldwide condition of current modernity without, in the same move, 
continuing to advance unsound generalizations from the West to the rest. If attracting cross-
disciplinary attention may be taken as an indication of potential for explanatory purchase, I 
believe that historical sociology’s attention to the multiple (trajectories to) modernities is surely 
one path worth exploring (Arnason 2002, Einsenstadt 2000, Larraín 2000, Moore 1967, 
Mouzelis 1999, Therborn 1995, Wittrock 2000).iv For its part, the notion of world society has 
lent itself for analyzing the global scope of modernity vis-à-vis its regional variations not only in 
sociology (Luhmann 1997, Stichweh 2000, Mascareño 2009) but also in international relations 
(Albert and Hilkermeier 2004, Buzan 2004). In relation to the critique of methodological 
nationalism, however, both traditions still have to prove that they are able to explicate the rise 
and main features of the nation-state without either reifying or obliterating it. The multiple 
modernities strategy seems to require too substantive an idea of different cultures or nations in 
order to understand what makes multiple modernities different expressions of a single 
modernity: a more open view as to the connections between their different histories is still 
needed (Gutierrez-Rodriguez, Botaca and Costa 2010). And the theory of world society that 
has so far been successful in providing stronger conceptual foundations to always ill-defined 
globalisation processes has however paid little attention to the actual success of the nation-
state as one of modernity’s crucial socio-political arrangements (Chernilo 2007a: 144-51).  
 
Can nations be regarded as the natural and necessary form of human community throughout 
history? Is the nation-state a natural and necessary form of socio-political arrangement but only 
in modernity? We have already said that in pre-empting the salience of nations over the past 
two centuries both claims do not seem so far apart. The presuppositional character of this 
ontological discussion finds expression in the normative question of whether the nation-state 
was, is and will continue to be, the ultimate source of modern political legitimacy. My 
argument here is that the modern idea of the nation has never been the unchallenged locus of 
political legitimacy in modernity. Rather the opposite, the nation actually arose alongside two 
other, equally important, forms. On of these are modern classes (Mann 1993, Hobsbawm 
1994, Fine and Chernilo 2003), the other is the universalistic conception of humanity that 
underpins cosmopolitanism vis-à-vis nationalism (Delanty 2006, Durkheim 1992, Fine 2007, 
Habermas 2001). Nation, class and cosmopolitanism did not first emerge as a challenge to each 
other but as a way of complementing one another. Furthermore, the idea of the modern 
nation-state could fully unfold thanks to the support it borrowed from both socioeconomic 
transformations in terms of class and the universalistic normative appeal of cosmopolitanism. 
Nation, class and cosmopolitanism all required one another and the nation has never been able 
to monopolise modern political loyalties. They all three coevolved in modernity and the 
moments in which they began looking incompatible are to be carefully explicated and 
accounted for rather than taken as self-evident truths.   
 
To take one example from the time of World War One, even chauvinistic writers such as 
Friedrich Meinecke were able to recognise that modern cosmopolitanism and the modern 
nation-state were co-constitutive. Meinecke’s thesis was that this allegiance was bound to 
dissolve at some point in the future but he had no problem in arguing that it had been a 
necessary connection: ‘The concept of the nation and of its autonomy was entwined and 
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entangled with ideas that threatened to suffocate it. Universal, cosmopolitan thought was so 
integral a part of this generation that reappeared even where a Romantic predilection for the 
national seemed to have overcome the cosmopolitan Enlightenment’ (Meinecke 1970: 69). He 
tried to grasp a trend that moved from an undifferentiated conception of humanity based on 
Christian natural law to a process of cultural differentiation along national lines and eventually 
to the unification of nations and states – as in the case of the German Reich in 1870 (Meinecke 
1970: 48). But even the belated constitution of the German national state owed a great deal to 
the original claim to universalism between the nation and humanity that underpinned the 
French Revolution: ‘the true, the best German national feeling includes the cosmopolitan ideal 
of a humanity beyond nationality (…) it is “un-German to be merely German”’(Meinecke 
1970: 21). Meinecke’s politics were undoubtedly nationalistic, and he seems to be falling for 
arguments 2 to 5 of methodological nationalism, but his assessment of the nation-state’s 
alleged success in shaping up modern social life is not based on explicating modernity out of 
the trajectory of any nation-state – however powerful that nation-state may be. 
Cosmopolitanism’s universalistic framework remains, on the contrary, a critical part of the 
explanation. Against the strong charge of methodological nationalism, therefore, Meinecke 
rejects the viewpoint that the nation’s stage of development is the source through which other 
aspects of modern social life are ultimately to be accounted for.v Modern conceptions of the 
nation and nation-state system require this kind of cosmopolitan layout. Indeed, a more 
analytical version of this argument is found in Norbert Elias as he brings classes back into this 
relationship between the nation and cosmopolitanism:  
 
The “we-feeling” of the pre-revolutionary upper classes of Europe, which surpassed 
the frontiers of states, was probably stronger than any “we-feeling” – any feeling of 
identity – which men of these upper classes had with the lower classes of their own 
country. Their attachment to their own state did not yet have the character of an 
attachment to the nation. With few exceptions national sentiments were alien to 
noblemen of Europe prior to the French Revolution and in some countries for a long 
time after it (…) It was only in class-societies, not in inter-state societies, that the 
identity feelings of the ruling elites, and in the course of time those of wider strata, too, 
acquired the specific stamp of national feelings (Elias 1996: 143-4)  
 
Elias seeks to explicate the transition from a cosmopolitan to a national outlook in terms of the 
rise of modern classes. At stake is what he refers to as the ‘duality’ of normative codes of the 
nation-state: ‘a moral code descended from that of rising sections of the tiers état, egalitarian in 
character, and whose highest value is ‘man’ – the human individual as such; and a nationalist 
code descended from the Machiavellian code of princes and ruling aristocracies, inegalitarian in 
character, and whose highest value is a collectivity – a state, the country, the nation to which 
an individual belongs’ (Elias 1996: 154-5). Normatively, therefore, the nation was valuated in 
so far as it seemed to be the place for the effective realisation of modernity’s inclusionary 
tendencies and democratic hopes. The nation was well regarded because it appeared to be an 
adequate vehicle for this kind of universalistic project in terms of one’s own ethnic group, 
one’s own comrades and human beings as a whole. Political and social democracy were not 
preferred because they were primarily national; rather the opposite, the importance of the 
nation depends upon its universalistic commitment. To be sure, these expectations have been 
only imperfectly if at all reconciled with the nation’s uglier side (Mann 2005, Wimmer 2002). 
But it should nonetheless be apparent that the abandonment of universalistic normative 
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principles in favour of ethnically or religiously oriented politics of identity only increases the 
risks of authoritarian or violent regressions.  
 
The extent to which the League of Nations and then the United Nations have lived up to the 
promises and standards upon which they were first instituted is surely questionable (Suganami 
1989). On the one hand, it can be argued that states were rapid in learning how to best defend 
themselves military because good legal arguments do not win wars in the battlefields. And 
peoples learnt equally quickly that a highly ‘creative’ reinterpretation of the historical record 
along national lines was rather useful to bolster internal unity, claim and reclaim territories and 
use other groups as scapegoats. Here, the nation-state’s own self-presentation as homogeneous 
and fully sovereign tends to lead to methodological nationalism at the level of more scholarly 
accounts. On the other hand, I should like to hold that the twentieth-century interstate 
architecture, deficient as it is, remains unconceivable without a universalistic interpretation of 
the right to self-determination that, as a matter of principle, grants to all peoples the possibility 
of becoming fully fledged nation-states. There is a cosmopolitan layout underneath the nation-state 
system, without the help of which no individual nation-state can claim its right to self-
determination in any meaningful way (Bull 1977). Indeed, this is precisely the kind of call that 
underpins recent attempts at the reconceptualisation of democratic theory along global lines 
(Benhabib 2002, Bohmann, 2007, Brunkhorst 2005, Habermas 2001). 
 
The key to transcending methodological nationalism lies here in explicating the nation-state as 
a modern form of socio-political arrangement instead of seeing modernity as the final result of 
a number of different and endogenous national developments. The universalistic conception 
of modernity that is necessary to overcome methodological nationalism will need to draw 
theoretical support from notions such as multiple trajectories to modernity and world society. 
But when it comes to delineating the rise and main features of the nation-state itself, the 
combined analysis of class, nation and cosmopolitanism may still prove crucial. Having said 
this, let me now turn to the historical version of methodological nationalism. 
 
History: The question of prevalence 
 
The central tenet of this version of methodological nationalism refers to its alleged prevalence 
throughout the history of the social sciences (argument 6) – and this is something on which 
most of the writers we reviewed in the first part of the article happen to agree. But if we look 
at things more closely, it is curious to note that there are two reather different cases being 
raised against so-called ‘grand’ social theory. Whereas Wimmer and Schiller criticise classical 
social theory for its ignorance of the nation-state (argument 7), for Smith, Giddens, Billig the 
problem lies in classical social theory’s reification or naturalisation of the nation-state (argument 
8). In other words, grand social theory is found equally at fault for having made too much and too 
little out of the nation-state. To that extent, arguments 9 (on Eurocentrism) and 10 (on the rise 
and fall of the nation-state) may be said to remain an implicit background for all forms of 
methodological nationalism. 
 
But over the past few years a different argument outlook is beginning to emerge; namely, that 
some of the ‘canonical’ texts of social theory are read together, they begin to offer a 
conceptualisation of the nation-state that is able to contribute to transcend methodological 
nationalism (Inglis 2009, Inglis and Robertson 2008, Turner 2006, Outhwaite 2006, Fine 2007, 
Chernilo 2007a). Despite all its inaccuracies and shortcomings, the claim is that the core social 
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theory refers to the critique of particularistic worldviews such as Eurocentrism and narrow 
analytical frameworks such as methodological nationalism. Differently put, at least part of the 
blame lies in current commentators for having backwardly imposed a sense on the necessity of 
the nation-state that does not actually transpires in these past writers’ works: a revision of the 
foundational period of the social sciences remains a precondition to overcome methodological 
nationalism. To be clear, I am not arguing here that all we need to do is to go back to read 
good old books. Neither is my argument that any individual writes got it completely right in 
relation to understanding the nation-state.vi But we ought to put into brackets what we think we 
know about their understanding of the nation-state and give new perspectives and propositions 
the opportunity to emerge. Their difficulties, as much as their tentative solutions, are 
instructive to account for the opacity of the nation-state in modernity. 
 
The kind of approach I believe we require is, again, aptly captured by Norbert Elias (1996: 
123): ‘The increasing tendency to conceptualize processes as if they were unchanging objects 
represents a more widespread pattern of conceptual development running conversely to that of 
society at large, the development and dynamics of which have noticeable quickened from the 
eighteenth to the twentieth century’. For what concerns us here, this means that, although 
references to the nation have been part of the philosophical and indeed theological lexicon of 
Western thinking for several centuries, its changing meanings have been transformed over 
time. Some commonality may of course be found among them; possibly around the notion of 
a group that shares one or more features so that their actual depiction as a group becomes 
plausible. But this is a recognition that says nothing about any alleged transhistorical 
immutability, cultural homogeneity and indeed evolutionary necessity: We must not gloss over 
the differences between unreflective images of the nation in the past and the kind of solid and 
stable self-presentation of nation-states during the twentieth century. 
 
For instance, already in the early eighteenth century, Giambattista Vico’s The New Science was 
established ‘on the principle of civil theology’ that was ‘able to describe the “ideal eternal 
history” traversed in time by the history of every nation’ (Löwith 1964: 124). In Vico’s work, 
however, the nation points neither ‘to the modern national state as such’ nor ‘to political 
institutions’ that would bring them closer to contemporary debates on methodological 
nationalism (Fisch 1970: xxiii). Rather, and very much within the context of early modern 
natural law theory, Vico was interested in a world ‘constituted by all the gentile nations taken 
together (…) “the great city of the nations, founded and governed by God”’ (Fisch 1970: xxv). 
The nation is for Vico a way to refer to those human populations whose historical differences 
were a result of God’s plans: ‘the principle of the common nature of nations which disclose 
the principles of the new system of the natural law of the gentes’ (Fisch 1970: xxxi). This view 
of the nation is already very different from Voltaire’s long essay on Universal History, the Manner 
and Spirits of Nations which, by registering different civilisations as way of putting forward a 
view of humanity’s universal progress, only a generation later had transformed the study of 
nations into an increasingly secular and empirical field of enquiry (Löwith 1964: 105). And this 
is again different from Kant’s (1999) use of the term. In his cosmopolitan writings at the time 
of the French Revolution, Kant was interested in the idea of Federation of Nations as the 
association of political communities which, organised as republics, would voluntarily enter into 
cooperative relations with one another with a view of establishing a future condition of 
perpetual peace. Needless to say, these early conceptions can hardly be uncritically related to 
romantic and post-World War Two notions that emphasised the nation’s central political role, 
cultural specificity and undying historical mission (Kohn 1961). Equivocal as they arguably are, 
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therefore, the references to the nation and the nation-state during the foundational period of 
modernity do not point in the direction to methodological nationalism. Revisiting the history 
of the social sciences may produce unexpected results so let me just finalise this section with 
two short additional examples that point in this same direction. 
 
The critique of imperialism and colonialism, we now know, was a key motif in such key 
Enlightenment thinkers as Rousseau, Kant and Herder (Muthu 2003). This theme 
complements standard reconstructions of these writers to demonstrate that standing up against 
Empires was as constitutive a trend of the Enlightenment as any other of its most salient 
features. Muthu’s (2003: 9) argument is that the more particularity and diversity was 
emphasised, the more inclusive these theories became: ‘as the particularity and partial 
incommensurability of human lives came to the fore in a number of late eighteenth-century 
political writings, the moral universalism that occupied a formal, but ultimately hollow, 
position in earlier political theories became more genuinely universal’. A nationalistic reduction 
was then effected after the Enlightenment and this may go a long way to explain the 
transparency of methodological nationalism that is associated with twentieth-century social 
sciences: ‘anti-imperialist sentiments largely fell by the wayside as the eighteenth century came 
to a close (…) By the mid nineteenth-century anti-imperialist thinking was virtually absent 
from Western European intellectual debates’ (Muthu 2003: 5). The thoroughgoing postcolonial 
critique of classical social theory on the basis of its Eurocentrism – indeed, colonialism and 
racism  (Connell 2007) – has a point when it asks for our empirical sources to be widened, 
methodological devices revisited, conceptual approaches refined, normative considerations be 
made far more reflexive. Beyond this, however, I remain deeply sceptical – indeed, I find its 
critique reductionist on several grounds: it is empirically wrong, as texts offer wider richer 
materials than what is being granted, it is conceptually misplaced because it treats cultures as 
undifferentiated wholes and thus replaces methodologically nationalism with methodological 
colonialism, and it is normatively conservative as it favours a politics of identity which in actual 
facts precludes the possibility of intercultural learning processes.   
 
My second example comes from Robert Fine’s reassessment of the relationship between Kant 
and Hegel that breaks with the caricature in which the former is the naïve representative of 
cosmopolitanism whereas the latter is the champion of nationalistic chauvinism. This view 
would have misunderstood the way in which ‘Hegel questions Kant’s association of 
nationalism with immaturity and blind passion by exploring the rational foundations of 
patriotism’ (Fine 2003b: 616). Instead of rejecting Kant’s cosmopolitanism tout court, Hegel was 
in fact concerned with cosmopolitanism being turned into an abstract and ideal notion devoid 
of any effective socio-historical and legal content; Hegel ‘makes cosmopolitanism real and 
opens the space for action on the basis of a more complex understanding of social reality’ 
(Fine 2003b: 610). The same Hegel who seemingly reified the state and attributed god-like 
qualities to it is now seen as a philosopher concerned with universal rights as well as national 
self-determination. In departing from more conventional readings of the social sciences’ 
history, Muthu and Fine’s interpretations are surely trying to recover their heroes from what 
they consider unfair treatment. But although I cannot follow the substantive implications of 
their reflections here I am interested in their methodological insight: the need for shedding 
new light on past works and explanations we allegedly know all too well. In other words, the 
naturalness of the nation-state that is now attributed to past social theory may have to be 
addressed back to current commentators’ own lack historical insight on the foundational period 
of social theory. There is a chain of thought in operation whose perverse logic reinforces the 
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image of the prevalence of methodological nationalism in social theory. In simplifying the 
representation of the past, we effectively narrow down the analytical scope of our current 
enquiries. Only one trend or event is seen as constitutive of the past period in which we are 
interested, which then becomes the only relevant aspect of concern and we feel justified in 
overlooking conflicting trends. As we lack a clear theoretical backbone to hold our 
explanations on the nation-state together, we can no longer put forward a real explanation of 
what is it that we were interested in understanding, which in turn favours its eventual 
reification. We have moved full circle when the whole historical trends we sought to explicate 
in the first place, the rise and main features of the modern nation-state, is now hypostatised by 
that single event that has become the centre of our theoretical worldview – the social sciences’ 
own methodological nationalism. Because social theory and the nation-state allegedly mirrored 
each other historically, the former is chronically prone to reification and the latter becomes the 
one modern social trend that is in need of explaining. The nation-state is now the centre of 
modernity and modernity is reconstructed as the sum of whatever number of national 
trajectories that can be accounted for with the help of social theory. Time has come to start 
breaking this vicious circle apart.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The contemporary relevance of discussing methodological nationalism lies in the fact that it is 
found in social theory as much as in empirical research, in states’ self-presentation and in 
everyday media and political discourses. The paradoxical constitution of the current debate 
may be a reflection of certain substantive properties of the nation-state itself – of the opacity 
of its position in modernity.  
 
The turn-of-the-century writings on globalisation that gave new impetus to the debate on 
methodological nationalism need to be criticised for having conflated the necessary conceptual 
critique of the methodological nationalism with the empirical claim of the nation-state’s 
diminishing relevance. The argument I advanced in this article is, on the contrary, that we pay 
more rather than less attention to the nation-state itself. We need a deeper appreciation of the 
nation-state’s key features so that we can theorise it rather than naturalise or reify it. In order 
to transcend methodological nationalism effectively, we must deepen the critical scrutiny 
devoted to whatever feature of the nation-state that may help us explicate how and why it has 
been so successful in becoming a key organising centre of modern social life. But a critical 
aspect of this same success that still requires further explication is how the nation-state has 
been able to cope, rather successfully as well, with the fact that it has never been as triumphant 
and homogenous as it has portrayed itself to be. We need strategies that allow us to make 
sense of the nation-state’s past and main features but which also avoid attributing them full 
coherence. And we have equally seen that the solutions we may be able to offer are bound to 
prove unstable and create difficulties of their own.  
 
In relation to reassessing the thesis of the historical prevalence of methodological nationalism 
in social theory, there are three final points to be highlighted. First, the task of immersing 
oneself in the history of social theory is no second-class intellectual endeavour. It does not 
replace empirical research nor can it be understood as the uncritical celebration of a 
disciplinary commonsense. It is however a job that requires time, care and the critical and open 
mind that is intrinsic to all scholarly projects. What I am calling for here is for the history of 
ideas to be given a critical role within social theory itself. Secondly, we must remain sceptical 
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when distinctions between ‘them’ and ‘us’ get too neat. We are better off when we integrate 
our own contributions as a part of, rather than standing in opposition to, the intellectual 
traditions to which we belong. This may not bode well in terms of catching public attention 
but it does help reinforcing epistemological cogency, explanatory purchase and normative 
awareness. Third, a subtler understanding of past writings on the nation-state may still be one 
of our best antidotes against the reintroduction of methodological nationalism by the back 
door: current uses of the nation seem to have little to do with eighteenth-century’s references 
to it. And past social theory is a valuable asset when it comes to addressing this difficulty. We 
are still in need of a more sensible understanding of the development of the nation-state vis-à-
vis the evolution of the different conceptions of it in modernity. We have to find a way to 
delineate the enduring features of the nation-state that effectively make it a single socio-
political arrangement in modernity. But this is a strategy that must simultaneously be able to 
express the changing faces of the nation-state itself. 
 
The distinction between two versions and critiques of methodological nationalism hereby 
offered may help us correct some imbalances and difficulties. The more we refine our 
knowledge of the foundational period of the social sciences, the less plausible nationalistic 
explications of modernity become; the more social theory’s universalistic outlook comes to the 
fore, the better we will be able to transcend its Eurocentric bias. This way of transcending 
methodological nationalism requires more rather than less from social theory. It is the attitude 
of permanently going back and reassesses social theory’s own previous presuppositions to see 
whether methodological nationalism is being surreptitiously reintroduced. It is a commitment 
to trying to grasp the substantive features of the nation-state as a modern form of socio-
political arrangement and being also prepared to resist the temptation of making it the key 
explanatory variable of modernity. It means a suspicion of rapid assurances on the nation-
state’s successes and failures, its fantastic potentialities and horrible demons, so that we do not 
fall prey to the nation-state’s own uncritical celebration nor, indeed, of its critics’ equally 
uncritical damnation.  
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NOTES 
                                                 
i An obvious addition to this list is of course the discipline of International Relations (Shaw 2000, 
Scholte 2000) but I have elsewhere dwelt on the connections between the so-called domestic analogy 
debate in IR and methodological nationalism broadly understood (Chernilo 2010). In addition to the 
disciplines I discuss here, the debate on methodological nationalism has proved illuminating in 
geography (Agnew 2007, Antonsich 2008), comparative education (Robertson and Dale 2008), memory 
studies (Levy and Szanider 2002), media studies (Mihelj 2008) and development studies (Gore 1996). 
ii There is no hyperbole here. As I have criticised Ulrich Beck for introducing, in spite of his best 
intentions, methodological nationalism back into his own conceptualization of the nation-state 
(Chernilo 2006), he responds to this charge that I failed to realise that that he always intended to use the 
notion of methodological nationalism ‘metaphorically’ (Beck 2008: 240).  
iii An even bolder version of this argument, possibly the closest we can get to a defence methodological 
nationalism without however using the term, or indeed accepting that it is a form of reification, is 
found in Liah Greenfeld (2006: 159 & 161). In her view, nationalism is not only ‘the constitutive 
element of modernity’ but of ‘the modern culture. It is the symbolic blueprint of modern reality, the 
way we see, and thereby construct, the world around us, the specifically modern consciousness’. The 
problem with nationalism studies may simply be that their interest in the trees do not allow them to see 
the forest: the problem of conceptualising the nation-state as a modern form of socio-political 
arrangement has proved so taxing that they lose sight of the insight that the nation-state is a result 
rather than a cause of modernity. 
iv Barrington Moore’s (1967) classic Social Origins of Democracy and Dictatorships is key here. To the extent 
that his three routes to modernity (bourgeois, fascist and communist) are exemplified through different 
national cases his work can be read as deploying a strong kind of explanatory methodological 
nationalism. But insofar as his book is actually concerned with those structural developments that led to 
the rise of these three modern routes, class relations and international contexts are the real causes and 
national cases the outcome in explaining the rise of modernity. 
v It is interesting to note that, roughly at the same time, Ernst Troeltsch (1958) could advance a similar 
account of the relationship between the nation-state and ‘the idea of humanity’ but without seeking to 
advance a strongly nationalistic agenda.  
vi On this, see Justin Rosenberg (2005) vindication of Leon Trostky vis-à-vis IR’s systematic failures in 
theorising the international. 
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